COMMUNICATION ON MATTERS LEARNED

ter sessions cannot be compelled by mandamus to make such
a transfer. It can be made from person to person, but not
from place ro place: (Laib & Co. v. Hare et al.Judges, 163481.)
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The defendant being employed by the plaintiff to manage his business,
and having access, in the course of his duties to his master's books,
secretly copied from the order book a list of the names and addresses of
the customers, with the intention of using it in soliciting orders from
them, after he had left the plaintiff's employ. Subsequently, his service
with the plaintiff having terminated, the defendant did use the list so
obtained, while employed by another in a business similar to that of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff applied for an injunction restraining the defendant from the use of the list and requiring him to deliver it up to the
plaintiff for destruction, and also for damages done to his business by the
defendant's solicitation from the list. All of these requests were granted,
and it was held by HAWKINS, J., that it was an implied term of the contract of service that the defendant would not use, to the detriment of the
plaintiff, information to which he had access in the course of the service, and, therefore, that the defendant was liable in damages for any
loss caused to the plaintiff by reason of the breach of that term. In the
Court of Appeal (affirming the above) it was held that it was an implied
term of the contract of service that the servant would observe good faith
towards his master during the existence of the confidential relation
between them, and that the defendant's conduct was a breach of that contract in respect of which the plaintiff was entitled to damages and injunction.
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Both in the lower court and in the court above the decision
was placed on the ground that in every contract of service
there is an implied stipulation that the servant will observe
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good faith towards his employer in respect of the matters
confided to him. At the same time the court did not limit the
applicability of its statement with regard to implied contracts
to the relation of master and servant. Before viewing the
particular ground of the present case, the general statement of
the court with reference to implied contracts will be considered.
In the court below, HAWKIxS, J., quotes the language of POLLOCK, C. B., in M organt v. Rave', 6 H. & N. 265, with
approval: " We think the cases have established that where a
relation exists between two parties, which involves the performance of certain duties by one of them, and the payment of
reward to him by the other, the law will imply, or the jury
may infer, a promise by each party to do what is to be done
by him." This statement is not clear, but doubtless refers to
a contractual relation between two parties, and the enforcement of duties connected with the contract, but not directly
contemplated by the parties, or forming the main purpose of
the contract. In these cases there may or may not be a
public policy favoring the performance of certain duties by
either. The most obvious example of the presence of public
policy is the case of an inn-keeper or common carrier. In
other cases public policy seems to be satisfied by the observance of good faith. Now, so far as the terms of the contract
refer to those considerations which are present to the minds
of the parties and form an inducing cause, we are no doubt
not speaking literally when we say that a jury may infer
a promise to do that which the law has imposed on one in his
position. This distinguishes contracts or terms of contracts
so inferred from contracts inferred from conduct, as where an
agreement to pay for goods is inferred from an order or
request to furnish them. On the other hand these cases of
implied contract are to be distinguished from those where the
only remedy takes the form of a remedy in contract. In the
latter case there has been no contract or voluntary relation
between the parties. Where, however, the parties have voluntarily entered into a relation which contemplates certain objects,
the doing of anything by one of the parties inconsistent with
that end, or which would make it ineffectual, may well be
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considered a part of the contract, so as to prevent recovery
and also give right to recover for an injury arising therefrom.
The question is not whether the act or conduct which actually
prevented the party from receiving the benefit to which he
was entitled, was contemplated by the parties, but whether it
was so related to the performance as to make any benefit
received of no value. This is the view of BowEN, L. J., in
Lamb v. Evans, [18931 I Ch. 218, 229. He there says:
" The common law, it is true, treats the matter from the point
of view of an implied contract, and assumes that there is a
promise to do that which is part of the bargain, or which can
be fairly implied as a part of the good faith which is necessary
to make the bargain effectual. What is an implied contract
or an implied promise in law? It is that promise which the
law implies and authorizes us to infer, in order to give the
transaction that effect which the parties must have intended
it to have and without which it would be futile."
Implied contracts within the above meaning are most likely
to appear where the object of the contract is not a single act,
but a course of action, as in the relation of master and servant.
The question as to what conduct is inconsistent with the
servant's duty, takes the form of a justification for a discharge.
Thus in Macdonald on Master and Servant, it is said (p. 210):
"A servant is bound to consult the interest of his master and
may be discharged for acts seriously injurious thereto. Disclosure of a master's trade or business secrets, disclosure of
the accounts of a company to a person connected with another
company, advising and assisting an apprentice to quit his
master's service, . . .- in all these instances masters have been
warranted in dismissing servants." In all these cases the only
ground of dismissal has been a breach of the servant's contract
for faithful service, and though the point has not arisen, there
can be no doubt that if any injury was occasioned to the
employer, he would have a right of action against such a
servant.
Likewise any agreement, act or conduct by an employee in
the course of his work, for his own profit and to his master's
prejudice, will be treated as contrary to public policy and of
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no effect: Lum v. Clark, 57 N. W. Rep. 662 (Minn.); Woodstock Iron Co v. Exlension Co., 129 U. S. 642; Davenport v.
Hulme, 32 N. Y. Sup. 803 ; McEwen v. Schannor,64 Vt. 583.
Where an employee is intrusted with a trade secret, the
use of this secret for his own profit and to the disadvantage
of his employer will be restrained: Pabodj, v. Noifolk, 98
Mass. 408 ; A/orison v. Jfoat, 9 Hare, 281 ; Fralickv.Davel,Port, 3o Atl. Rep. 521 (Pa.). In Tabor v. Hoffman, II8
N. Y. 30 (I889), the defendant had invented a pump, the
patent on which had expired. He was manufacturing pumps
with an improvement incorporated in his pattern, which was
not made public. The defendant hired a man who was
employed to repair the patterns to make copies of them. The
defendant was enjoined from the use of the patterns so
obtained. Most of Jthese cases place the decision on the
ground of a breach of confidence without determining its
effect on the contract of employment. But there can be no
doubt that disclosures of such a secret would justify dis'nissal, enable the employer to resist an action for wages due,
and entitle him to damages.
Where a person makes use of the information he has
learned in a confidential relation the grounds of the decision
against such use are variously stated as a breach of trust,
violation of an implied contract, or the interference with a
property right. And sometimes it is indicated that a distinction is to be drawn between them. In the present case [i895]
2 Q. B. 319, KAY, L. J., says that there has been a breach of
trust, if not a breach of contract, and that an injunction
should be granted and the list of names should be given up
to be destroyed. He continues: As to the damages, I think
there is more difficulty. The right to them depends on
whether the conduct of the defendant can be regarded as a
breach of an implied contract." The distinction intended by
the Lord Justice is not clear. Without the confidential relation, which was violated by the making and use of the list,
there would be no ground for an injunction. In Corliss v.
Walker & Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 28o, it was sought to restrain a
photographer from making copies of a photograph, which he
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had purchased from another photographer who had taken
.them for the plaintiff without the privilege of reproducing
them for his own profit. The court said: "When a person
engages a photographer to take his picture, agreeing to pay
so much for the copies which he desires, the transaction
assumes the form of a contract; and it is a breach of contract, as well as a violation of confidence for the photographer
to make additional copies from the negative. The negative
may belong to the photographer, but the right to print additional copies is the right of the customer: Pollardv. P/hotographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 545; Tuck v. Priester, 19 Q. B. D.,
629. Independently of the question of contract, I believe
the law to be that a private individual has a right to be protected in the representation of his portrait in any form ; that
this is a property as well as a personal right; and that it
belongs to the same class of right which forbids the reproduction of a private manuscript or painting, or the publication of
private letters, or oral lectures delivered by a teacher to h;s
class, or the revelation of the contracts of a merchant's books
by a clerk : Duke of Quieusberri,v. Shallcare, 2 Edm. 329;
Ger v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Folsom v. Jfarch, 2 Story,

ioo; Abernetly v. Hitchinson, 3 Law J. Ch. 209; Caud v.
Simc, 12 App. Cas. 326; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare, 383;
Williams v. Insurance Co., 23 Beav. 338." It seems to the
writer unimportant whether the communication of matter
learned in the confidential relation is regarded as a breach of
trust or a breach of contract or a violation of a property right,
so far as the right to compensation is concerned. There can
be no doubt of the applicability of the principle to the present
case. The secret copying of the list with the intention of
using them in competition was undoubtedly a dishonorable
means of enabling the servant to maintain a competition with
his master after the employment. The fact that a servant
after the termination of his employment may compete with
his former employer for the trade of his customers of the
employer, (Irish v. frisk, 40 Ch. D. 49; Helmorc v. Smith,
35 Ch. D. 449,) will not justify every means to facilitate that
competition taken by a servant in violation of his present duty
to that employer.
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